COLUMN: Deserting the middle ground

From Seth Lasser's, "For Mass Consumption," Fall '97 From Seth Lasser's, "For Mass Consumption," Fall '97 It has been easy to lose touch with reality in the weeks following the signing of the agreement on redeployment in Hebron. Tremendous fanfare surrounded the end of more than six months of excruciatingly difficult talks between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Yasser Arafat -- as if the results signified an event of monumental proportions. The majority of Hebron's residents live today under Palestinian rule due to an agreement made by a right-wing Israeli government; other issues will soon be discussed. Do the facts on the ground not speak to great progress made? The actual situation belies this superficial reading of the unfolding of events; the truth exists in somewhat less rosy hues. Not only is there little substance in this small step forward, but the manner in which the agreement was reached signals grave problems for the future. The agreement signed between Netanyahu and Arafat is almost indistinguishable to the one agreed to but never implemented by the Peres government last year. We are left to scoff at official explanations of its tremendous improvements and to wonder what took so long. The major differences supposedly lie in the "Note for the Record" drafted by American mediator Dennis Ross. This note lays out the remaining responsibilities of the parties in the interim period before they begin to negotiate the so-called Final Status issues -- those of the greatest consequence and thus the most contentious of all. Yet the document merely details four promises each side had already made but never carried out. Unfortunately, this agreement is the sum of the progress made by the new government in its quest for a full and lasting peace. For the past six months, Netanyahu and his administration have simply tread water. This standstill is not due solely to Netanyahu's lack of political experience. Rather, the coalition that was formed is itself split on ideological grounds. A gridlocked situation now exists where little can be accomplished due to internecine feuding. This is exacerbated by Netanyahu's absence of a strong base of personal power. While the parliament confirmed the withdrawal by a large margin, the agreement received support from only slightly more than half of the cabinet. With a certain amount of veto power, the ultra-nationalist forces have a voice greater than their support in the population at large. The intransigent diehard right have bound Netanyahu's hands for the past six months. If they remain in power, they will continue to do so. Netanyahu was elected to follow a middle road, to bridge the gap between the alarming speed at which Peres and the Labor party moved through negotiations and a rejection of the concept of dealing with Yasser Arafat. He was elected by an extremely small margin; many voted for him more out of distrust for his opponent Peres than out of warm feelings for Israel's first made-for-TV prime minister. People voted for his party's ambiguous campaign slogan, "Making secure peace," rather than against working towards a solution to the conflict. A majority of the Israeli electorate is in favor of making peace based on the land-for-peace formula. The real debate centers around not whether to form a Palestinian entity but how much and which lands to cede, and at what speed to do so. As a recent editorial in an Israeli newspaper said, "the public understands that the alternative to the peace process is intifada, terror, and in the end, war against the Arab world." There are members of the Israeli cabinet who have not taken stock of this reality, such as one who insisted the new agreement went against the "general tendency" of his government "to preserve the land of Israel" -- a catch phrase for a continued Israeli presence in the territories. This misunderstanding of the political landscape has already created problems, and the issues under discussion were minor compared to those lying ahead. The lack of substantial progress is likely to continue in the future for the same reasons as in the past. Politically speaking, Netanyahu is mortgaged to the hilt. He simply lacks the room to maneuver that is desperately needed when engaged in complicated negotiations extending over a period of years. Commentators have long spoken of Netanyahu as a seeker of glory and power above all else. To win for himself the place in history he seems intent on receiving, he must stop playing to the hard right who, as negotiations get more sensitive, will be more likely to thwart what needs to be done. The language of diplomacy and affairs of state are almost always dry, ambiguous and easily predictable. Any permutation in regular statements to the press by a high government official are of interest, and imply content reaching deeper than they may appear. The Israeli Defense Minister's words to the largest Israeli newspaper on the day of the redployment are particularly noteworthy. The minister -- long seen as the most moderate member of the cabinet -- told reporters he "will do everything? so that the extremists from both sides will not interfere with the course of events." That he publicly recognized the dangers of the hardline right on the Israeli side as well as the Palestinian side shows a better understanding of the road ahead than Netanyahu. The formation of a new coalition with Netanyahu still at the head, one that does not include believers in yesterday's dream of a greater land of Israel nor her highly unpopular left-wing, is the only way for Netanyahu to keep his head above water and begin to make some headway. The present course has been hindered by the speed bumps of the internal govermental tension. But at this rate, there lie ahead walls which the current government can not succeed in breaching.