COLUMN: Growth of the 'Imperial Presidency'

From Seth Lasser's, "For Mass Consumption," Fall '97 From Seth Lasser's, "For Mass Consumption," Fall '97 President Clinton won the right to use the line-item veto two months ago, a power allowing him to eliminate individual items of spending or tax bills without vetoing the bill entirely. This week, he used it for the second time, cutting 38 items from next year's defense bill. Proponents of the measure argue that use of the line-item veto will help reduce "pork" -- governmental spending whose purpose is only to direct federal money towards the districts of powerful congressmen. Clinton insists he based his decisions on what to cut on three criteria: items not requested by the Pentagon, items that would not contribute to national defense and items that would not benefit the quality of life of the men and women of the armed forces. He cut $287 million from the defense budget, but more than $500 million is still allocated to things the military did not request. In this light, Clinton himself seems to have picked and chosen according to political priorities. The debate over whether presidents should have the line-item veto has been raging for years, with presidents and congress sticking to their guns. Newt Gingrich and other "Contract with America" authors made the line-item veto one of their major campaign promises in the 1994 elections. The Republican leadership had originally calculated that its sweeping success in that congressional election would lead to victory in the 1996 presidential race. The Republicans went forward with the proposal anyway, claiming the desire to make government more efficient. That most 20th-century presidents have been Republican was an added motivation. In any case, the line-item veto has moved the equilibrium of executive-legislature relations, giving the president even wider abilities to put his imprint on the legislative process. Like any issue in democratic politics, vetoing a project will not simply make it disappear. Legislators disappointed that their pet projects were axed have methods of recourse. Overriding a presidential line-item veto is an achievable process. First, the House of Represenatives and the Senate must each vote to disapprove a specific line-item veto. The president is given another opportunity to veto the bill entirely. In lieu of that, the clauses are overridden. A more likely series of events would be for the members of Congress involved to sit down with the president and hash out a compromise. Though the scheme does increase the power of the executive relative to the legislature, there remains ample reason for the president to wheel and deal with Congress. Before the recent defense spending bill, Clinton exercised his new right in vetoing two proposed tax breaks, one of which would have given tax break to poorly defined "farmers' cooperatives." Instead of bringing the matter to another vote in the House and Senate, a middle position was reached where Clinton's main concern about the bill was assuaged. As the law now reads, a limited amount of capital gains would be tax free, limiting its effect to smaller-sized corporations and not benefiting large agricultural conglomerates. In the same way, some of the defense expenditures killed by Clinton may be restored, if the President's points of contention can be addressed to his satisfaction. If we assume a good proportion of presidential vetoes can be worked out in this so-called "overtime period" to the satisfaction of all parties involved, than the effect of the line-item veto may be limited to greater attention being paid to bills' more controversial provisions. Detractors may cite this as another example of Capitol Hill gridlock, the often times amazingly long period of time between the original legislative proposal and the enacting of the bill into law. However, legislators are now forced to consider the possibility that pieces of their bills may fall victim to a presidential veto. The main goal was, of course, to eliminate their ability to slip unnecessary clauses into important legislation in hopes that they will be ignored. Another effect will be the streamlining of legislation, as clauses likely to be cut out as the president handles to the bill will be cut beforehand. In this light, it is possible the legislative process may be shortened in many instances due to the elimination of debate over nominally important issues. Members of Congress will pressure their comrades to keep provisions that are likely to fail from wasting their time While "pork-barrel politics" will never go away, it seems clear that this new system will help to reduce its occurrence. The true significance of this measure is to increase the imbalance in power between the executive and the legislature. America was founded as a presidential democracy -- as opposed to parliamentary systems. American presidents do not wield influence in the legislative process merely because they are the head of the majority party. Over the past 50 years, however, presidents have steadily increased their powers, best exemplified by the ever-diminishing importance of Congress on foreign policy issues The growth of "The Imperial Presidency" is furthered by the vesting of even greater legislative powers in the hands of one branch of government. The Supreme Court is likely to rule on this issue as soon as Congress finds an opportune time. The ruling will have ramifications on the system of checks and balances that eclipses Congress's ability to play "pork-barrel politics."