Only after being able to anticipate all of my opponent's possible moves, and convince myself that I can counter each move by taking his king, can I confidently declare checkmate. On a much grander scale, a similar war is fought between viruses and vaccines. The weaponized virus has a series of possible moves, including mutations and genetic alterations. To ultimately win, the vaccine must be able to match each of them.
The history of warfare presents a shifting balance of power between offensive and defensive tactics. In medieval times, defensive superiority reigned -- castles with large surrounding walls guaranteed a knight's safety. But the invention of the cannon offset the military balance. Defense lost its monopoly of power and triggered social and political change in feudal Europe.
Today, a terrorist's offensive strategy has a clear comparative advantage over a highly organized society. Most of our countermeasures are reactionary, such as heightening security to lower the probability of an incident.
Stabilization will occur only when defense is on par with (or stronger than) offense. This is the equilibrium we seek. The key to reversing the current imbalance -- especially on the biological weapons front -- can be achieved through science.
Bioterrorism is one area where we have the potential to significantly bolster our defense. Right now, engineering a more virulent form of a virus takes only a few months, while countering the process with a vaccine takes years. Speeding up the vaccination development process is desirable. We are moving in the right direction.
The ultimate goal is to design "smart" vaccines that will destroy viruses that have been engineered to evade the regular vaccines. Regular vaccines target a specific form of a given virus. If the virus mutates or is genetically altered, the vaccine becomes ineffective. "Smart" vaccines would target a more fundamental aspect of the virus that remained unchanged by the mutation or alteration.
Researchers at Saint Louis University have genetically designed a more virulent form of mousepox in an effort to develop vaccines that would be capable of dealing with similar manipulations of smallpox. The research is quite controversial: the fear is that terrorists will learn about innovative, lethal forms of viruses before we develop the vaccines.
Does this sort of thing aid terrorists? Sure it does. After the Cold War, when Soviet scientists were asked how they had come so far so fast, they responded, "We read your science journals."
But don't overlook the other half of the question: how has western science come so far? Well, we read our own journals too.
There have been calls to curb the dissemination of scientific research that could further the evolution of biological weapons. Since the anthrax outbreak in 2001, any work involving the development of biological agents has faced high public scrutiny. This is myopic, though, because creating superbugs designed to evade vaccines is precisely how we will figure out how to defeat them.
Step-by-step recipes for building or manipulating lethal viruses should not be publicized. But it is important to heed the advice dispensed last week by the National Research Council, an independent Congressionally chartered group. The council recommended against any sort of major research restrictions.
Strategically, the advice makes sense. Our research infrastructure is far superior to that of terrorists and rogue states; obstacles would slow the progress of western science far more than it would hinder the work of our enemy.
Restricting the freedom of information is futile, anyhow. If our enemies are determined, they will find a way to get information -- spying, bribing or instructing those here on student visas to report secrets back home.
But keeping scientific lines of communication open does not preclude an effort to increase awareness of the bioterrorism risk among scientists. Only by allowing scientists and journal editors an element of self-regulation can we ensure that commonsense measures be taken without substantially hampering the flow of new information, thus stifling the pace of research and even discouraging others to enter the field, a trend that would have long-term consequences.
It's vital to keep up the momentum of biodefense research until we offset the offensive advantage of the biological weapons. We must continue to develop creative, adaptable vaccines until we can counter all of the virus' moves, essentially cornering biological warfare into a stalemate.
Sarah Eskreis-Winkler is a sophomore Diplomatic History major from Wynnewood, Pa.
