COLUMN: ?the more things stay the same

From Seth Lasser's," "For Mass Consumption," Fall '97 From Seth Lasser's," "For Mass Consumption," Fall '97 Previously on these pages, we have considered the state of American foreign policy as the reigns of power are handed over to a new group of government officials. I suggested that any differences between the new Secretary of State and the old would be superficial. Perhaps the reasons for this are not immediately obvious. Perhaps an example may better illustrate this point. Last August, Saddam Hussein decided to invade a part of his territory the U.S. and her allies were patrolling. Before the first shot was fired, the form that America's reaction would take was being debated. Would it be more prudent to launch air strikes or to launch missiles against his regime? What kind of targets should be hit? Would we inflict punitive damage and further limit Iraq's war-making capabilities? Iraq would have to pay the price for acting against the wishes and stated policies of the United States of America -- the only question was how. Noticeably absent from the debate was consideration of whether action was necessary or even wise. All nations act to protect their interests in the manner they see fit; this is the first tenet of international political relations. It was barely examined whether the U.S. should get further involved in an already convoluted situation. Would this be the best move to protect our interests? It was left as a given the U.S. must act, for we would be seen as weak if we failed to. Perhaps there are times when our interests would be better served if we did not always depend on gunboat diplomacy -- on the big stick of our military might. Yet such ideas are nearly absent from current political debate. The unwavering sense that we Americans have of our identity and our purpose on the globe dictates our foreign policy in a deeply intransigent manner. At this moment in history, we are the most powerful nation in the world. As we often remind ourselves, America possesses the world's largest economy and its largest and most effective military machine. We propagate our ideas across the globe. We preach to every state that they should become a democracy and join the global free market. The reason for this is the old adage, "Democracies do not attack each other." A world comprised of democracies is a safe and stable world where free trade can flourish. The extension of the "liberal democratic order" -- the entanglement of multilateral institutions that communally regulate trade and security, described by Political Science Professor John Ikenberry -- stands as our gospel. At the head of the table of liberal democracies sits the United States. Along the way, there have been many nations bucking the trend, questioning the notion of a joint political governance dominated by the United States. The former Soviet Union and her communist allies are the most notable example. They proffered a philosophy of international affairs that stood diametrically opposed to our own. The passing of communism from the world -- the People's Republic of China itself is no longer, in an economic sense, a Communist nation -- means the disappearance of most of our competition. Few nations go against the grain, seeking to remain outside of the "ordered world." The reasons for this are manifold, but fear of the wrath of the U.S. plays a role in the predilection of most nations to remain on our good side. Distaste for the role the U.S. has made for itself is not limited to the non-Western world, where such sentiments are the basis for many a politician's rise to power. Attempts by other members of the liberal democratic order to assert independence are painted by the United States as deviation from the group line. More often than not this line is drawn by the U.S. itself. The current controversy over America's attempt to isolate "rogue states" such as Iran, Libya and Cuba has pitted Canada and France, among others, against the U.S. Legislation passed by Congress makes it illegal for a foreign company doing business in the United States to invest significant amounts of capital in either Iran or Libya. Other legislation imposes penalties on foreign companies that deal in assets in Cuba formerly owned by Americans. The chutzpah, the unmitigated gall of Congress in passing such legislation is astonishing. American laws, they assert, can bind the hands of international corporations to further American political goals, all in the name of safeguarding the Western world. We are bullying our allies into insuring the economic demise of Cuba, Iran and Libya. Moreover, we refuse to allow the world court to arbitrate the dispute, citing issues of national security. It is hard to imagine an American diplomat keeping a straight face while proclaiming today's Cuba to be a grave national security threat. In the long term, alienating our closest allies over matters as insignificant as the fate of Cuba may not be in our best interests. While right now we are the most powerful nation in the world, who knows how long this moment will last? We need not make the logical step that plagues America's foreign policy thinkers: because we are at the apex of our power, we must wield it incessantly to fulfill our every wish. If the United States is truly interested in the emergence of free markets and open political systems in every nation, it must learn to be less antagonistic when attempting to further those goals. As citizens of the United States, with the ability to have informed opinions and thus influence the political process, we must reconsider our nation's attitudes to the other states in the world. The failure to correct our course will lead to stormy seas ahead.